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Résumé 
Cet article analyse les transformations des relations verticales et plus 
particulièrement la dualité des modes de coordination au sein des nouvelles 
architectures industrielles. L'objectif est de caractériser le rapport entre 
l'architecte et les sous-traitants de premier rang, en fonction du degré stratégique 
des compétences maîtrisées par ces derniers. Deux modèles de coordination "arm's 
length" et "intégration de systèmes", coexistent au sein de la même architecture 
industrielle. Le recours à l'un ou l'autre varie selon la politique d'achat et le degré 
stratégique des sous-ensembles délégués. Ainsi nous analyserons le système de 
sous-traitance d'Airbus en nous focalisant sur l'importance de la politique d'achat. 
L'argumentation s'articule autour de deux parties. La première appréhende les 
relations verticales dans le cadre de productions complexes, en insistant sur les 
aspects organisationnels. La seconde analyse la transformation du système 
productif Airbus en s’axant sur le processus d'achat et l'émergence d'une 
coordination duale des sous-traitants de premier rang. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the transformations of industrial vertical relationships, and more 
particularly the duality of the coordination modes within new industrial architectures. The 
paper aims to characterize relationship between the architect and the first-tier suppliers 
according to the strategic degree of their competence. Two models of coordination arm's 
length and systems integration coexist within the same industrial architecture. The 
recourse to one or the other varies according to the policy of purchase and the strategic 
degree of the sub-contracted subsystems. Thus we will analyze the system of 
subcontracting of Airbus by focusing to the importance of the purchasing policy. The 
argumentation articulates in two parts. The first one considers the vertical subcontracting 
relationships in the framework of complex productions, by insisting on organizational 
aspects. The second one analyses the transformation of the "Airbus" productive system by 
focusing on purchasing process and the emergence of new First-tier supplier’s 
coordination modes. 
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Introduction 
The 1980s and 90s were characterized by a tendency by firms to re-focus on their core 
business activities (Paulré, 2000; Batsch, 2002). This movement gave rise to “strategic 
alliances”, based on the look for complementary competences, which in turn modified 
traditional subcontracting relationships. Given that the increase of global competition, a new 
stake becomes essential: a fall of procurement cost.  
In this new context, Airbus has implemented a purchasing rationalization to achieve the 
goal to match costs and competences. The latter scales up proportionally to global, structural 
and financial changes.  
The traditional subcontracting function no longer corresponds to modern industrial 
practices.  Henceforth, the first-tier suppliers work with wide specifications and are 
responsible for their own products. 
Therefore, given the growing complexity of the products and systems produced 
(Complex Product Systems or CoPS, Simon, 1962 ; Hobday, 1998; Brusoni and Prencipe, 
1999)
1, the Orderer becomes an industrial architect, breaking down his product (considered as 
a system) into an integrated and coherent group of sub-assemblies, the design and production 
(and responsibility) of which are entrusted to a restricted number of direct equipment 
suppliers which in turn are responsible for organising their own subcontracting network. 
In this configuration, we shall go on to emphasize the link between vertical sub-
contracting relationships and purchasing strategy.  
To do this, we will analyse (1) the vertical subcontracting relationships in the 
framework of complex productions, by insisting on organizational aspects. Then (2), we will 
show the transformation of the "Airbus" productive system by focusing on purchasing process 
and the emergence of a new First-tier supplier’s coordination modes.  
I. Vertical subcontracting relationships, modularization and 
purchasing strategy  
After having analyzed on a theoretical level the complexification phenomenon and its 
incidences on subcontracting relationships, we will clarify the impact of the purchasing 
strategy on an emergent duality of coordination modes.  
                                                 
1 According to Simon (1962), "A complex system is made up of a large number of parts that interact in a 
nonsimple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical 
sense but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, 
it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole". Hobday, 1998 (p. 690) defines complex products 
and systems (Complex Product Sytems or CoPS) as "products with a high value, requiring a lot of engineering, 
for the sub-systems or constructions provided by production units". Brusoni & Prencipe (1999) summarize 
CoPS, with a high value (high cost), made up of numerous interacting personalized elements. Their design, 
development and production involve several firms, they display emerging properties and there is a high degree of 
user involvement. Thus, a modular approach is required in order to understand the industries which produce such 
CoPS. Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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1.1. A complex industrial organization 
1.1.1. The Network-Firm 
Traditional analyses of vertical relationships characterize the network-firm as a vertical 
network structured around the pivot firm (assimilated to a head of network) coordinating the 
activities of a group of small and medium-sized companies, with the aim of carrying out a 
specific project (Guilhon, 1992; Baudry 1995 & 2003).  
These relationships between this Head of network et these different partners or co-
contractors are called/said cooperations (Butera, 1991; Paché and Paraponaris, 1993). Inter-
firm cooperation, means a durable commitment, between legally independent partners, in a 
common project (in which profits will be share), fairly, with a right & duty balance (Rullière 
& Torre, 1995).  
Empirically, partnership of vertical sub-contracting relationships will be progressively 
remise en cause (Altersohn, 1997). From now on, the Orderer gives unilaterally the price, 
wants a cost and delays decrease, and involves financially its partners. But in the same time, 
the Orderer sets strict quality standards.  
Billaudot & Julien (2003) sort out the sub-contracting relationships on a scale from 
fulfillment of generic product which entails a low intelligence degree (technical division of 
labour based on price) to fulfillment of dedicated product (achieved specifically for the 
customer), which generates a relationship of high intelligence degree (cognitive division of 
labor based on competences) (Moati & Mouhoud, 2005).  
1.1.2. The Pivot-Firm
2 
1.1.2.1. Emergence process 
In this analysis framework, the first-tier supplier, seems to have a large range of 
responsibilities (conception, production, financing). It has the responsibility to organize its 
own sub-contracting.  
In this sense, Baudry (1995) considers that, this coordinator is localised to an intersection 
between a speciality sub-contracting relationship (upstream and partnerial) and capacity sub-
contracting relationship (downstrrem and a classic arm’s lenght type relationship).  
Although they recognize the complexity and the interweaving nature of subcontracting 
relationships (Mariotti, Reverdy and Segrestin, 2001), economists define the pivot-firm as the 
"formal regulatory organ" of the vertical network, i.e. the main player (Billaudot and Julien, 
2003; Abdul-Nour and al. 2003) rather than the intermediary. Thus, since it adheres to the 
traditional analysis of the "network-firm", the economic notion of "pivot-firm" remains 
assimilated to that of an architect of network (Billaudot and Julien, 2003; Abdul-Nour and al., 
2003; Baudry 2004).  
However, we suggest that this traditional classification now needs to evolve, in order to 
constitute a truer reflection of current practices. Indeed, this pivot function has been from now 
                                                 
2 For fuller developments to see Mazaud (2006) Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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on delegated sometimes to a first-tier supplier, which are a real hinge of vertical network 
(Mazaud, 2006). 
1.1.2.2. An indespensable re-definition  
The pivot function, assimilated to a "Hub firm" (Jarillo, 1988), or Strategic Center 
(Lorenzoini and Baden Fuller, 1995), refers to the central nodal of a network.  
Miles and Snow (1986) refer to the player in charge of the intermediary function as a 
"broker". This player fulfils three distinctive roles within the network: the role of 
"architect" (constitutes the network), that of "lead operator" (coordinates the companies) and 
that of "caretaker" (maintains the network and ensures its long-term survival) (Miles and al. 
1992). These functions are part of a horizontal relationship (cooperation), and can be carried 
out by one or more entities.  
For this reason, in a hierarchical organisational configuration, Fréry (1997) prefers to 
use the concept of nodal, the formal organ for regulating transactional structures. This nodal – 
a single player – is responsible for three simultaneous functions: design  (major strategic 
orientations and selection of other players involved), coordination (optimisation of links with 
the aim of limiting the costs inherent to the hierarchy), and control (dissuading opportunistic 
behaviour that could disrupt the overall effectiveness of the structure).  
The 1980s and 90s were characterized by a tendency by firms to re-focus on their core 
business activities (Batsch, 2002). This movement gave rise to a "cooperative" relationship 
network, based on the need to engage the services of external suppliers, which in turn 
modified traditional subcontracting relationships. Thus this enables the development of 
intermediation function of the first-tier supplier.  
By re-focusing on its core business activities, the architect has given up some of its key 
knowledge and is no longer able – for certain strategic sub-systems – to determine the 
interfaces and specifications unilaterally (Pavitt, 2005). Bearing in mind all these elements, 
we can describe some first-tier supplier as Pivot-Firm.  
A Pivot-Firm is a "strategic partner which, on the one hand, co-designs the sub-system 
under its responsibility with the Integrator, co-specifying the required interfaces, and, on the 
other hand, develops strategic and combinatory competences, in the framework of a 
hierarchical network.” (Mazaud, 2006)
3. 
1.1.3. A key concept : the strategic competence  
Competence concept is based on a "resources-based view", which considers firms as 
collections of resources of various types (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
This theory emphasizes the firms’ heterogeneousness, due to the specific resources 
possession that is to say asset, capabilities, process and knowledge (Barney, 1991). The nature 
of these resources can lead to get a lasting competitive advantage, in generating rents (Peteraf, 
1993). 
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The difficult imitation (feature) of a resource fits into the knowledge’s tacit dimension 
of the resource (Polanyi, 1966; Colletis, Pecqueur, 2005). As the tangible resources are easy 
to imitate the intangible dimension is a differentiation factor. That is why, resources have a 
strong cognitive dimension (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant 
1996; Spender, 1996).  
By comparison, the organizational capabilities, that is to say ability to coordinate and 
integrate whole firm’s resources (Chandler, 1990), is going to increase. What gives a firm’s 
competitive advantage are not resources but rather than abilities to implement (Grant, 1991). 
Inspired by evolutionist analysis, the “dynamic capabilities” characterize the firm's ability "to 
integrate, build, and recon  figure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments" (Teece and al. 1997)
4. 
It seems appropriate to underline the adaptative and even defensive feature (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989), of these capabilities. The latter are as routine repertoire, enabling a firm 
adaptation to environmental evolutions (Teece and al., 1997), by the technological and/or 
organizational problem resolution (Teece, 1988). 
From then on, approach in terms of competence (Foss, 1996) set up a proactive vision 
of resources. Firm would have ability to change their own environment (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1990). The core competences show the organization’s collective learning, which are essential 
to “coordinate diverse productions skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies” 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1990
5).  
Accordingly Sanchez and al. (1996), having a coherent theoretical corpus, they consider 
firm as a system open on its environment. The firm competence means its ability to durably 
coordinate the use of its resources, in adapting itself and acting on its environment, according 
to previously determining objectives (Sanchez, 2000 & 2004; Durand, 2006). Therefore, the 
strategic feature of competence consists of identifying, extending and using business 
opportunities (Carlsson and Eliasson, 1994), which based on industrial strategic factors (Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993), and on environment.  
The strategic competence covers three key dimensions: contribution in value creation, 
scarcity (Rumelt, 1987) and lastly opacity, which means less or more easy to non-imitate 
(Meschi, 1997). Therefore, it appears obvious that the first-tier suppliers, as Pivot-firms, 
which control a strategic competence, have an undeniable advantage.  
1.2. Modularisation of vertical relationships 
1.2.1. A move towards modularisation of complex industrial 
architectures? 
Modularity is a strategy to effectively organize complex products and processes (Starr, 
1965; Baldwin and Clark 1997). The approach involves dividing a complex system into 
independently designed and produced units or modules, which are linked together via 
interfaces, i.e. "visible design rules", defining the place, the function and the interactive 
modes of each module (Baldwin and Clark, 1997 and 2000).  
                                                 
4 p.516 
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Ulrich (1995) defines product-architecture as the system via which "a product’s 
function is allocated to physical components”
6. Thus, the product architecture is an 
arrangement of functional elements, which contribute to the performance of the overall 
product.  
This product architecture is described as modular when the interfaces are linked, i.e. 
when there is an identity between the product’s physical components and the functional 
elements of the system. The modification of one component does not lead to any modification 
of the linked component, nor of the system as a whole.  
However, the product architecture is said to be integral when the interfaces are not 
linked, i.e. there is no identity between the product’s physical components and the functional 
elements of the system. Each component can carry out several functions and each function 
can be carried out by several components (Foss K., 1998).  
Thus, a productive modular organization is orchestrated by an architect-firm, making up 
the firm network that it needs to create the overall system (Baldwin and Clark, 1997, 2000).  
The architect role becomes essential in the interface definition (Frigant and Talbot, 2002 
and Frigant 2004). The interfaces can be assimilated to information. According to Baldwin 
and Clark (2000), in a modular perspective, the interface characterizes all the information – 
the "visible design rules" - which define the place, function and interaction modes of each of 
the modules, bearing in mind that other, invisible, information is specific to the design and 
production of each of the modules. This underlines the importance of the interface 
specification.  
Modularisation is becoming the dominant model in complex vertical relationships 
(Langlois, 2003). It enables the manufacturing process to be reorganized, based around 
standardized interfaces. This leads to increased flexibility (Brusoni and Prencipe 1999), 
reduced production costs and lead times (Fujimoto and Takeishi, 2001).  
Finally, organisational modularity necessarily involves an organisational architecture 
based on the autonomous technological design of each module (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). 
1.2.2. The nature of the interface determines the nature of the 
relationship  
According to Baldwin and Clark (2000), in a modular perspective, the interface 
characterizes all the information – the "visible design rules" - which define the place, function 
and interaction modes of each of the modules, bearing in mind that other, invisible, 
information is specific to the design and production of each of the modules.  
The interface is considered as "pivot" between the producer’s resources and the user’s 
resources (Loasby, 1998), which raises the question of the customer’s access to the supplier’s 
resources (Araujo, Dubois, Gadde, 1999).  
In the framework of subcontracting relationships, the notion of interface goes beyond 
the mere work specification and addresses the question of complementarity in terms of 
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competences, i.e. the knowledge, experience and know-how of the individuals who make up 
the firm (Richardson, 1972).  
The interface between customer and supplier - more specifically, that between the 
Orderer and the Subcontractor – is crucial since, on the one hand, it depends on the nature of 
the modules exchanged and, on the other hand, it characterizes the relationship between the 
two firms (Asanuma, 1989).  
Araujo, Dubois and Gadde (1999) have identified several types of interface, from the 
standardized interfaces to interactive interfaces, via specified interfaces and translation 
interfaces.  
When the interface is standardized, it is a  simple "buy and sell" interfaces, 
corresponding to standard products which have already been designed and produced by the 
subcontractor, and which are sold in the latter’s "catalogue". The resulting relationship is 
therefore of the commercial type – a classic "arm’s length" type relationship.  
Opposed to the standardized interfaces, we find the interactive interfaces, when the 
specifications are drawn up jointly by the supplier and its customer. This leads to a common 
learning process, since the two entities interact, developing the ability to use the other’s 
resources. 
More the interfaces are standardized; more the organizational configuration of 
customer-supplier relationship will be of modular type, giving space to flexibility, as well as 
to reduced cost and shorter lead-time. 
Conversely, more the interfaces trend towards interaction, more organizational 
configuration will be of integral type. Thus, the customer-supplier relationships will be 
characterized by a lower flexibility and stepped-up production costs. 
1.3. Purchasing policy and dual coordiantion modes of sub-
contracting relationship 
1.3.1. Purchasing strategy and strategic segmentation 
The firm has  split up into function parts (Research & Development, Production, 
Finance, Procurement, etc.). Each functions has to reach the goal, which a global and long-
term strategy. For each of these functions, particular strategy has implemented.  
The purchasing strategy uses purchasing to express itself, accompanied with available 
means and their instructions for use instructions leaflet (Gauchet, 1996; Bruel, 2005). Some 
constraints (suppliers, competitors’ purchasing strategy, general firm’s strategy) and some 
means (purchasing budget) impose upon it.  
This purchasing strategy comes in a variety of purchasing policy in accordance with a 
strategic segmentation of purchases. This segmentation is often based on the technological 
nature of the component families, integrating analysis of the technological competences 
controlled by the suppliers, or even the risks linked to competitors.  Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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Next, the key success factors for each segment have to be determined (costs, quality, 
lead time, related services, etc.). An individual strategy is then developed for each segment, 
ensuring that each strategy remains strictly consistent with the firm’s general strategy 
(Loubère and Perrotin, 2005). 
For each homogeneous family of purchasing, a specific policy will be implement by the 
objective fixing (growth rate, profitability) and means determining (financial and human). 
In a modular approach, the product is divided in sub-systems, classed according to their 
strategic importance.  
According to Venkatesan (1992), there is a strategic difference between these segments, 
according to the specific impact they have on the firm’s competitiveness.  
The strategic sub-systems have a direct influence on the main attributes (including cost) 
of the final product. They are inputs with the highest added value, linked to the selling firm’s 
main area of competence, and can be useful for differentiating the final product (Dyer, Cho 
and Chu, 1998).  They require a highly specialized design, and therefore, very specific 
competences and assets.  
On the other hand, non-strategic sub-systems mainly develop mature technology. They 
are relatively standardized inputs, and only require a slight degree of inter-dependency 
between supplier and customer: the need for coordination is therefore low (Dyer, Cho and 
Chu, 1998). Their specialized design does not have a very strong impact on the final product 
in terms of differentiation. 
1.3.2. Supplier strategy, a dual coordination mode of verticla sub-
contracting relationships 
Each purchasing strategy leads to conduce to the set up a supplier policy. That means a 
segmentation of potential supplier range, in homogeneous family according to diverse criteria 
(price, product, supply, etc.).  
The strategic degree of the subcontracted segments influences the choice between a 
single or multi-source policy, bearing in mind that for the most strategic segments, there are 
very few independent suppliers with the competences required for their design and 
development.  
In accordance with the opposition between the Japanese and American models (Clark, 
1989; Dyer, 1996; Dyer, Cho and Chu, 1998), we can distinguish two types of supplier 
relationships.  
The traditional approach, known as Arm’s Length, which dominated until the late 1980s, 
gives absolute priority to cost. The architect "steers operations", in a balance-of-power 
relationship, maintaining technical control over the product and providing itself with the 
means to modify its choice of suppliers (multi-source procurement), depending on the cost 
factor. The architect acts as a real Orderer, ensuring that interfaces are as standardized as 
possible in order to obtain a flexible supplier network and reduce its costs (Sako, 2005).  
Since the late 1980s, the fact that firms have tended to re-focus on their core business, and the vertical 
disintegration of activities, have given rise to the development of strategic alliances (Jarillo, 1988; 
Prencipe, 2005).  Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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Indeed, for the most strategic segments, partnerships (almost hierarchical) have been set up. Cost is no 
longer a decisive factor – it has been replaced by the notion of "total acquisition cost", covering all the 
costs incurred by the procurement (cost, quality, lead times, after-sales service, problems) (Dyer and 
al., 1998).  
This duality in terms of coordination modes for vertical relationships is at the centre of the distinction 
we make between modularisation and systems integration (Frigant 2005). 
The Vanishing Hand model (Langlois, 2003) considers the architect firm as an Orderer, 
defining ex ante the parameters of each of the delegated modules, standardizing the interfaces 
as far as possible, in order to reduce the costs linked to coordination and production of the 
final product. This organisational configuration corresponds to a technical division of the 
work, combined with the strive to reduce costs to a minimum (the modules are 
interchangeable).  
Langlois (2003) defines the coordination mode relative to modular-type decentralized 
production observed in the 1990s as "vanishing hand." This is an intermediary coordination 
situation – not entirely free but not entirely integrated – with the established domination of the 
commercial relationship, and it is therefore similar to an Arm’s Length type strategy. 
The approach in terms of systems integration (Dosi, and al. 2005) focuses on firms, 
which produce complex products (CoPS).  
Prencipe (2005) defines the systems integrator as an "organisation that builds up the 
network and controls it from an organisational and technological point of view”. The 
integrator develops partnerships with the suppliers of the most strategic sub-assemblies: it 
corresponds therefore to a strategic-type alliance (Dyer and al. 2001).  
According to Prencipe (2005), this model is based on a resources-based view, which 
considers firms as collections of resources of various types (Penrose, 1959). Firms are thus 
considered as integrators of internal or external information and knowledge (Moati, 2001). 
From a strategic point of view, the systems integrator configures the network as regards the number, 
type (direct or indirect) and intensity of relationships (Brusoni, Prencipe & Pawitt, 2001). In practice, 
this distinction between coordination modes is not always easy to make: the architect can be the 
Orderer or the Systems Integrator, depending on the type of sub-assembly delegated.  
II. Airbus-France First-Tier suppliers strategy
7  
In this part, we will illustrate, thanks to a practical analysis focus on Airbus, the 
previous theoretical contributions described above. The two main principles which are 
modularisation and purchasing process involve dual relationships and coordination mode with 
Airbus firs-tier suppliers. 
                                                 
7 This study was produced in the form of monographs between 2005 and 2006. 
A series of interviews were conducted with all the Airbus SAS and Airbus France Procurement Managers. 
Airbus’ main equipment suppliers were also questioned.  Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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2.1. Airbus, a modular-type production focused on purchasing 
process 
2.1.1. A rationalization of purchases  
In the late 1980s, Airbus re-focused on its core business as an aircraft manufacturer – 
general design, cockpit, avionics, engine pylons, final assembly, certification, etc., and 
proceeded to outsource those activities which it judged non-strategic (Frigant and al. 2006).  
In order to remedy a certain lack of consistency and efficiency regarding its 
subcontracting policy, Airbus elected, in 1993, to rationalize its purchasing, the objective 
being to reduce the number of direct subcontractors from six hundred ninety to around one 
hundred by the year 2000 (Alcouffe and Corrégé, 2004).  
This movement occurred at the same time as the setting up of a pyramid-shaped 
industrial architecture, with the development of "general subcontracting" (Larré, 1994), which 
consisted in a transfer of responsibility to the equipment supplier as regards financing (risk 
sharing, Alcouffe, 2002)
8, development, production and responsibility for the complete sub-
assemblies (including the organization of its own sub-contracting network) (Colletis, Lung, 
2006).  
From 1995, cross-functional progress measures known as CAP (growth and adaptation 
through processes) and CAP 2001 were implemented, with the aim of reducing procurement 
costs by 12 to 15% by 2001 (Talbot, 2001). These measures continue to the present day 
through the Road 06 and the latest Power 8 programme
9. This rationalization has led Airbus 
to modify its organization and divide its purchasing into five categories: 
- "Aerostructures", organized into Centres of Excellence spread over the various 
production sites
10, and specialized in the production of a particular section. Each Centre 
delegates "Work Packages" to Aerostructure suppliers, i.e. complete sub-assemblies (80% of 
aerostructure subcontracting), while the rest (detail parts, electrical assemblies and interiors) 
is outsourced to a variety of subcontractors. 
- "Equipment items" are line replacement units that have a function within the aircraft 
structure. This category covers “traditional” mechanical equipment items (hydraulics, air 
conditioning, landing gear, etc.) produced by equipment suppliers, and all avionics systems 
(on-board electronics, computers) produced by system suppliers. 
                                                 
8 The most common form of risk sharing is the “Non Recuring Costs” (NRC) : the physical interface provides 
financial support for the development and industrialization of the module under its responsibility. These costs are 
passed on to the sale price of the module; however, they are based on forecast sales (expenditure to be recovered 
over x-number of aircraft). If sales do not reach the level of the forecasts, the intermediary bears the resulting 
losses. 
9 Louis Gallois, CEO of Airbus,confirmed the maintenance of “Power 8”,ie the reduction of the number of the 
suppliers of Airbus of 80% (from 3000 to 500) since 2010. 
10 Wings in the UK (Bristol and Chester-Broughton), rear fuselages, customisation and assembly of single-aisle 
Airbus aircraft in Germany (Hamburg, Bremen and Brunswick), stabilizers and belly fairings in Spain (Madrid, 
Cadix) and, in France, machining of the nose and forward fuselage section in Méaultes, center fuselages in 
Nantes and Saint-Nazaire, and final assembly, flight testing and certification in Toulouse. Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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Embedded system: computer systems that form an integral part of a product (hardware) with 
software etc. Avionics is an application of an embedded system for the navigation and control 
of aircraft. The onboard electronics used for piloting anaircraft are called avionics (aviation 
electronics). Avionics include communications and navigation systems, autopilots, and 
electronic Flight Management Systems (FMS). Onboard electronics that are unrelated to 
piloting tasks, such as video systems for passengers, are sometimes considered avionics as 
well. Many of these devices include embedded computers. The term is also used to define the 
electronics units fitted to a spacecraft.  
So, in accordance with this distinction between embedded systems, the competition 
between aircraft manufacturers is increasingly based on the differenciation power related to 
the embedded systems. 
- "General Procurement" is difficult to outsource in a general way – however, the 
current trend is to outsource complete assemblies, transport, communication, etc.  
- Engine: this equipment category involves a particular & specific relationships 
bewtween engine manufacturers and Airbus. This relationship cannot be called sub-
contracting, because of the engine manufacturer power. 
- « Materials » in this case, it is a traditional / classic procurement. Nevertheless, many 
strategic materials entails international cooperations (like Titanium, composite,...). 
2.1.2. The supply-chain management: the example of Equipments and 
Systems Purchases Department 
2.1.2.1. Supplier selection process  
The Airbus supplier selection process is applicable to any supplier willing to do busines 
with Airbus. The Airbus supplier selection process comprises the following steps: 
•  The signature oh the Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA) between Airbus and suppliers 
initiates the supplier selection process to protect the data exchanged. 
•  Potential suppliers sata is collected via the launch of Airbus Request of Information (
  (RFI) and/or Request for Technical Information (RFTI). 
•  A short list is then created based on market analysis, offset requirements and previous 
experience with the supply base. The short-listed supliers are then sent an Airbus 
request for Proposal (RFP). 
•  Responses from suppliers to the RFP are evaluated against specific criteria based on 
the technical, quality, contractual and commercial requirements of Airbus. 
2.1.2.2. Concurrent engineering process 
As one of the leading manufacturers in the aerospace industry, Airbus continually 
strives to increase the efficiency and scope of collaboration with its suppliers. Recognizing 
the need to implement an integrated electronic procurement management program, Airbus Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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developed Sup@irWorld
11, which enables a more efficient procurement practices and 
effective management of supplier relationships. 
Sup@irWorld consists of four Web-based domains that cover the entire aircraft life-
cycle and procurement process: 
• Sup@irWorld Sourcing: Allows for a paperless process where buyers and suppliers collaborate by 
exchanging technical requirements and proposals. 
• Sup@irWorld BuySide: Provides an automated and harmonized order fulfillment 
process via the implementation of an e-procurement software package. 
• Sup@irWorld eSupplyChain: Covers the entire supply chain cycle, including ordering 
and logistics though an integrated online workplace. 
• Sup@irWorld Found@tion: Provides an overview of all suppliers and their products 
and a set of reporting tools to support decision-making. 
Thus, Sup@irWorld helps to decrease deadlines & cut coordination costs, as well as 
expand worldwide sub-contracting. 
2.1.2.3. Transversality of purchasing 
In this framework, cross-functional teams - the Multi-Functional Teams (MFT) - manage the 
purchasing activities of a given segment in a flexible way, their main objectives being to 
increase efficiency and reduce procurement costs.  
These MFTs are divided firstly into Project Management Groups (PMG), responsible for 
steering an even more specific segment of the project, then into Integrated Project Teams 
(IPT), responsible for the development and production of specific items.  
These IPTs meet on design platforms and integrate both Airbus personnel and equipment 
suppliers. This is a "concurrent engineering" process aimed at the collaborative development 
of products. Their perimeter varies depending on the stage of the project or the difficulties 
encountered. 
However, it would clearly appear that the purchasing segments do not all have the same 
strategic importance for Airbus, depending on their added value and respective ability to 
differentiate the final product.  
2.2. First-tier suppliers strategic segmentation, a dual organization 
In this very hierarchical organization, Airbus has ensured that the most strategic 
competences remain internal (wing, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, engine integration, 
fuselage sections, on-board electronics, flight control computers, avionics, etc.) – such 
competences constitute its "Core Business". Nevertheless, 70% of the cost of an aircraft is 
purchased externally.  
                                                 
11 This entails a fruitful cooperation with advantages like lower overhead, enhanced performance, increased 
visibility across the enterprise, a uniform way of working with suppliers, and the ability to make more accurate 
decisions. Airbus has met its key objectives of improved business processes, increased automation, better 
integration and enhanced reporting capabilities. Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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As the Architect, and in order to rationalize procurements, the aircraft manufacturer 
deals almost exclusively with first-tier full suppliers, which are responsible for the 
development, financing and production of complete sub-systems.  
The strategic segmentation of its purchasing activities has led Airbus to apply a similar 
segmentation as far as its suppliers are concerned (Zuliani, Jalabert, 2005).  
2.2.1. Systems Integration relationships  
This kind of relationship is a matter of the most strategic first-tier supplier.  
They manufacture strategic equipments & systems of which Airbus owns a competence 
in design conception. The major equipments and systems suppliers produce strategic sub-
assemblies such as avionics systems, with Thales Avionics or Rockwell Collins, for example, 
or certain sensitive equipment items (aerostructures or mechanical equipment), such as 
fuselage parts, with Latécoère, or air conditioning systems with Liebherr Aerospace, in 
particular.  
Thales Avionics, thanks to these competences in avionics, is the best example of 
strategic first-tier supplier. The typical example of a strategic partner is Thales Avionics, 
which has developed perfect technical control of on-board systems. Indeed, Thales Avionics 
disposes of complementary competences to aircraft manufacturer that enable a value added to 
the Airbus final product.  
Theses first-tier suppliers, in possession of real strategic competence with a high added 
value, are pivot-firms
12 (Mazaud, 2006). Airbus develops strategic partnerships with them.  
In this relationship Airbus acts as systems integrator. Production of the most strategic 
systems and equipment items (on-board electronics, air conditioning, certain parts of the 
structure, etc.) leads Airbus to work with pivot-firms in order to jointly specify the interfaces 
and determine the work specifications, the conditions required to ensure correct integration of 
these sub-systems in the overall product as well as their interconnection.This gives rise to a 
genuine strategic partnership.  
Airbus maintains its general design and control prerogatives, but relinquishes its 
coordination function in favor of pivot-firms, which are the only entities capable of 
combining the competences required for the design and development of the sub-assemblies 
under their responsibility. The systems integration relationships are mainly based on the first-
tier supplier possession of strategic competences. 
2.2.2. Arm's length relationships  
The Arm’s length relationships are described by Dyer et Singh (1998, p.661). 
According to them "Arm's length market relationships are characterized by: 
-  non specific asset investments 
                                                 
12 In general, pivot-firms have developed competences that are both strategic – in the sense that they have few 
competitors throughout the world – and combinatory, since they are capable of mobilizing the resources required 
to produce idiosyncratic sub-systems which are specific to a given programme. In other words, these firms have 
succeeded in ensuring that the competences they possess are essential to Airbus, which consequently ensures the 
long-term duration of the relationship between the two companies. Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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-  minimal information exchange (i.e., prices act as coordinating devices by signaling all 
relevant information to buyers and sellers), 
-  seperable technological and fucnctional systems within each firm that are 
characterized by low levels of interdependence (i.e., the two organizations have only a 
sales-to-purchansing interface and do not jointly create new products through 
multifunctional interfaces), and 
-  low transaction costs and minimal investment in governance mechanisms (Williamson, 
1985)". 
This kind of relationships is relevant to the less strategic first-tier supplier. Airbus acts 
as an Orderer, providing a very precise description of the interfaces (which may be specified 
or translation interfaces) and the work specification, and leaving little room for maneuver for 
its subcontractors, which are mainly selected on a cost basis.  
Furthermore, they are frequently forced into competition with one another, through a 
benchmarking system
13.  
As regards less strategic equipments suppliers, Airbus aims to reduce its coordination 
costs and therefore limits its role to simply being aware of the lower tier subcontractors who 
have been selected in order to reduce its costs.  
2.2.2. Airbus, a dual firm  
According to Cohendet & Llerena (2005), the two preceding approaches are more 
complementary than opposite. A same firm can simultaneously create and allocate resources i.e. 
manage competences and transaction.  
"In this “dual” vision..., first [the firm] focused on the bulding of the domain of core 
competence...giving full priority to the creation of resources. Then, ... the firm tends to allocate 
resources and to adapt to the environment in accordance with governance mechanisms that are well 
analysed by the transaction cost approach" (Cohendet & Llerena, 2005, p. 176-77). 
Airbus can be apprehended like a dual firm because of its dual management of procurement. In 
spite of a dual management of relationships with first-tier supplier, ambition to reduce cost of 
purchasing is omnipresent.  
However it has to respond to important requirements in terms of quality and environment. In 
addition to the international quality standards in force, the reliability of sub-assemblies is ensured by a 
very strict supplier evaluation system, known as "rating", which is managed by the various 
"Purchasing" divisions within Airbus.  
The equipment suppliers are rated according to total quality criteria (quality, costs, lead times 
and control over industrial risks) further to annual audits. 
                                                 
13 Benchmarking shall consist of "finding, at international level, the company(s) that perform a given task or 
process in the most efficient way, going to study the way they perform such task or process, for as long as its 
prices remain competitive. Price benchmarking is relatively common, and is necessary to maintain a healthy 
level of competition between two or three suppliers. Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers' coordination 
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Conclusion 
Competition and financial profitability constraints the Orderers to only solicit a limited 
number of suppliers, which must cover a larger area of responsibility. The structure of 
production organization becomes more hierarchical and coordination modes seem to move 
towards a single model for the transaction costs’ reduction.  
While on a theoretical level it allows for greater visibility, in practice, a modular 
approach cannot guarantee a sufficient insight into the coordination modes with first-tier 
suppliers.  
By integrating purchasing strategy into our analysis, we have shown the diversity and 
continuity in coordination modes. This relational mixing is at the core of Airbus’ 
segmentation.  
The emergence of more and more strategic stakes involves a new structuring of vertical 
sub-contracting relationships.  
Procurement in Airbus, and particularly equipments & systems’ purchases has a major 
importance by becoming a key competence.  
The strategic dimension inherent in purchasing, leads to a fine a more differentiated 
management of the supply chain. This key competence lies at the crossroads of two aspects: 
-  A significant reduction in transaction cost for non-strategic market segments (a 
relationship based on cost for non strategic equipments and systems). 
-  The development of mutual learning, founded on cognitive coordination on strategic 
segments (a relationship based on competence for strategic equipments and systems). 
These significant changes, which are both cognitive and organizational, are occurring in 
parallel to other global transformations of the capitalist system. Thus, the movement of 
international sub-contracting gains in importance/momentum with supplier being located in 
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